Is Reason Intuitive?
Suppose a person wishes to claim that reason is the only game in town. When asked to justify this claim, our rationalist can either remain consistent, give a reason for reason, and simply accept the circularity, or else give up on consistency and appeal to intuition.
Now, if he chooses to be consistent, he can say that the circularity is non-vitiating. I suppose that sort of response is of considerable interest if one has a considerable interest in that sort of response!
For my part, I think an appeal to intuition is ultimately wise, though it discredits the “reason is the only game in town” thesis. On this view, the set of intuitions is truly disjoint from the set of reasons. I do not mean, as so many authors seem to suggest, that an intuition is something like an underdeveloped reason. An intuition is not a reason at all.