Gödel's God Theorem

In 2020 I published a book entitled Gödel's God Theorem, named for the Gödel-Scott Ontological Argument or, as I refer to it in the book, the Gödel-Scott System (GSS). But as a matter of actual fact, the book showcases four interlinking Leibnizian arguments for the necessary and unique existence of God. I say "unique" because it is fairly easy to derive a monotheism theorem from GSS.

The four arguments in the book are as follows:

1. GSS. A formalization of Leibniz's Ontological Argument (LOA) that axiomatizes a monadological notion of positiveness, where a positive property appears to be a conjunction of Leibnizian perfections.


2. ◇-Cosmological Argument (◇CA). My streamlined version of Leibniz's Cosmological Argument (LCA).


3. A Possible Worlds Argument (PWA). An ingenious little argument taken directly from Leibniz.


4. A Diagonal Eternal Truths Argument (DETA). My own invention that combines, on the one hand, Cantorian diagonalization and Gödelian incompleteness and, on the other hand, Leibniz's Eternal Truths Argument.

A Theological Note

The reader may rather understandably assume that these arguments have something to do with my faith. Not so! While I find these arguments philosophically and mathematically quite fascinating, I am theologically much closer to Nicholas of Cusa or even Thomas Merton. In my view, it is not wise to define God because God is indefinable! I have always felt that a notion of God that is too tidy or too sensible is undoubtedly an invitation to idolatry.

Indeed, my favorite concepts, like, for example, existence, are remarkably fuzzy. Moreover, they possess the curious property that when one tries to rigorously define them, or subject them to discursive processes, one only further obscures what they are! How much more would this apply to God, Who so far surpasses anything one might find in creation?